Ken Merena, an individual, and dba Merena Investments v. Alice Davis (fka Alice Merena) : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2011
Ken Merena, an individual, and dba Merena
Investments v. Alice Davis (fka Alice Merena) :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
William P. Morrison; Morrison & Morrison; Attorney for Appellee.
Loren M. Lambert; David S. Head; Attorneys for Appellant; Arrow Legal Solutions Group.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Merena v. Merena, No. 20110377 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2872
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KEN MERENA, an individual, and 
dba MERENA INVESTMENTS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v, 
ALICE DAVIS (fka ALICE MERENA), 
Defendant and Appellee, 
Case No.: 20110377-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
On Appeal from a Ruling of the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake Department, Honorable Denise P. Lindberg presiding 
Loren M. Lambert 
David S. Head 
Arrow Legal Solutions Group 
266 East 7200 South 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Attorneys for Appellant 
William P. Morrison (7587) 
MORRISON LAW OFFICE, INC. 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Tel: (801) 519-9772 
Attorney for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
UTAH 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page: 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT . 1 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Trial Court Proceedings & Disposition 4 
C. Merena's Prior Efforts to Appeal 4 
D. Statement of Facts 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 14 
ARGUMENT 16 
I. THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION BECAUSE A FINAL ORDER HAS NOT 
BEEN ENTERED 16 
II. MERENA DID NOT PROPERLY PRESERVE THE ISSUES 
HE IS NOW SEEKING TO APPEAL 20 
III. THE LOWER COURT WAS WELL WITHIN ITS AUTHORITY 
TO SANCTION MERENA, AND IT ACTED APPROPRIATELY 
IN DOING SO 23 
IV. MERENA HAS NO STANDING TO REQUEST A CHANGE IN 
UTAH LAW 28 
CONCLUSION 29 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 30 
ADDENDNUM 32 
1. Merena's previous efforts to appeal - . 
2. Judge Medley Contempt Order 
3. Declaration of Kenneth Merena 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page: 
Cases: 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 
(Utah 1998) 21, 22 
Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 19, 5 P.3d 649 20 
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 
4 8 P. 3d 968 21, 22 
i 
Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 
201 P.3d 966 (Utah 2009) 17, 18, 19 
Montgomery v. Cottam, 2011 UT App 308 20 
Statutes: 
Utah Code § 78-2-2 (3) (a) 2 
i 
Rules: 
Utah R. App. P. 10(a)(1) 1, 16 
Utah R. App. P. 24 (a) (5) (A) 22 < 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2) 2, 17, 18, 19 
i 
< 
ii 
< 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KEN MERENA, an individual, and 
dba MERENA INVESTMENTS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v, 
ALICE DAVIS (fka ALICE MERENA), 
Defendant and Appellee/ 
Case No.: 20110377-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT: 
Appellee maintains that this Court lacks jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal, because the Appellant has improperly 
sought to appeal a nonfinal order. This issue is more fully 
addressed at Argument I below. Inasmuch as this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal, it should dismiss the 
appeal forthwith. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS: 
Rule 10(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
governs motions to dismiss an appeal - for lack of 
jurisdiction. It provides: "A party may move at any time to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dismiss the appeal or the petition for review on the basis 
that the appellate court lacks jurisdiction." 
Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
governs orders entered by the district courts. It provides 
Unless the court approves the proposed order 
submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless 
otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing 
party shall, within fifteen days after the 
court's decision, serve upon the other parties 
a proposed order in conformity with the court's 
decision. Objections to the proposed order 
shall be filed within five days after service. 
The party preparing the order shall file the 
proposed order upon being served with an 
objection or upon expiration of the time to 
object. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
A. Nature of the Case: 
This case concerns a claim for defamation, filed by Ken 
Merena against his former spouse, Alice Davis. Following 
the filing of this case, the parties' marital relationship 
was subsequently dissolved through an annulment. 
At different stages throughout the pendency of this 
case, Merena has been represented by several different 
attorneys, and he also has represented himself. 
Contemporaneously with the pendency of this action, Merena 
has also been engaged as a party in a number of other legal 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
proceedings involving Davis, including but not limited to a 
-divorce/annulment action, a protective order proceeding, an 
action to challenge Davis' bankruptcy filing in the State of 
Montana, and a second defamation case he filed against Davis 
:i i i :i :i s 1: r :i • :: t :: :> i :i r t :i r 1 I J t a I: :t I: 1 s r e i I a 1: I a s b e e n r e p r e s e r I t e d 1: ] / 
counsel ir I these other matters. Employing an army of 
attorneys to represent him, and usir i.g litigation as a sword, 
he has mounted a persistent, ongoing campaign to harass 
Davis, strangle her with litigation, and destroy her 
f :i i lancia 1 
Merena's litigation abuse has not gone unnoticed. 
Instead, il li IL. n.\. ulh.'d in multiple; sanctions being levied 
against him, including monetary sanctions for costs and 
attorney fees, civi 1 contempt sanctions and also the filing 
i) f • :: r :i in i n a ] c h a r g e s :i :i I 11 I e S t a t e • : • f 1 1 o n t a n a (w 1 I i c 1 :i :i : • B m a :i n 
pending and unresolved) . E "acing mounting pressure to meet 
1: i :i s 1 e g a 1 r e s p o i i s i b i 1 i t i e s , M e r e i i a I : a s i i o w f led f r o m U t a h . 
To the best of Appellee's knowledge, he is currently 
residing out of the country,- where he appears content to 
litigate this matter from a perceived safe-distance, a] ] 
with the active aid and assistance of counsel. 
A mo r e d e t a i 1 e d a c c o i I i I :: e: f M e r e r I a' s a b u s i v e a i I • :I 
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vexatious litigation tactics, and the efforts undertaken by 
different courts of law to deal with those tactics, is more < 
particularly set forth in the Appellee's Statement of Facts, 
infra. 
I 
B. Trial Court Proceedings & Disposition: 
The course of the proceedings in this case, and the
 ( 
disposition of the case below, is found infra in the 
Appellee's Statement of Facts. 
i 
C. Merenar s Prior Efforts to Appeal: 
This appeal is not the first occasion by Merena to seek 
an appeal of the lower court's decisions. Instead, he has 
already twice attempted unsuccessful appeals. His prior 
appeals have either been summarily denied or summarily * 
dismissed, as more particularly noted below: 
1. First Effort to Appeal: On or about September 4, 
2009, Merena filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, 
which was assigned case number 20090723-CA. Merena's 
petition was summarily denied as untimely by Order of this ( 
Court dated September 11, 2009. Addendum 1. 
2. Second Effort to Appeal: On or about November 10, 
4 
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2009, Merena attempted a second appeal by filing a notice of 
appeal, purporting to appeal the "final" order of the lower 
court dated October 30, 2009. Addendum 1. This second 
appeal was transferred to the court of appeals and assigned 
case number 20090941-CA. This Court subsequently issued a 
Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition on December 1, 
2009, asserting that it appeared that Merena was seeking to 
take an appeal from a non-final order. Merena's appeal was 
promptly dismissed by this Court on December 21, 2009, 
pursuant to the parties' stipulation of dismissal". Addendum 
1. Shortly before dismissing the appeal, this Court also• 
entered an Order dated December 4, 2009, denying Merena's 
Petition for Emergency Relief for Stay of District Court 
Proceedings. Id. 
D. Statement of Facts: 
The following facts are pertinent to the disposition of 
this appeal: 
1. Merena and Davis were at one time briefly married 
to each other, but the parties' relationship deteriorated 
and they separated in August of 2007. P.. at 2-3. Davis 
subsequently filed a petition for divorce from Merena on 
5 
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August 20, 2007. R. at 3. 
2. Thereafter, Merena initiated the instant case by 
filing a complaint for defamation and injunctive relief 
against Davis on October 22, 2007, civil number 070915206, 
Judge Lindberg presiding. R. at 1-10. Merena's complaint 
was filed with the assistance of counsel. Id. 
3. On or about January 30, 2008, Davis filed a 
petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief in the District of 
Montana, case number 08-60066, Judge Kirscher presiding. 
The following day, Davis filed a notice of Chapter 13 
bankruptcy filing with the district court in the case at 
hand. R. at 42-45. 
4. Davis subsequently converted her Chapter 13 
bankruptcy petition to one under Chapter 7, and filed a 
notice of case conversion with the district court on May 2, 
2008. R. at 66-68. 
5. Merena was listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy 
case. With the assistance of counsel, he applied for and 
subsequently obtained an unopposed order granting him relief 
from the Bankruptcy Stay, thus allowing him to continue to 
litigate his defamation claims against Davis in state court. 
See, e.g., R. at 69-74. 
6 
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6. Simultaneously in the State of Montana, . Merena 
through counsel lodged an adversary proceeding against 
Davis, seeking to object to her bankruptcy discharge. See 
R. at 1248-75. 
7. The parties engaged in discovery in state court in 
the instant case, which resulted in numerous discovery 
disputes arising. Judge Lindberg held a hearing on October 
30, 2008, to resolve the discovery disputes. R. at 718-20, 
733. . Both parties were represented by counsel at this 
juncture of the case. 
8. At the hearing on October 30, 2008, Judge Lindberg 
determined that both parties were responsible for the 
discovery disputes that had arisen, but found that the 
plaintiff, Ken Merena, was primarily at fault. The court 
ruled as follows: "The Court finds that a significant amount 
of the fault here lies with the plaintiff, as he has been 
too over-reaching in his discovery requests. Moreover,' 
plaintiff's subpoenas have been plagued with mistakes, 
including a lack of proper advanced notice regarding the 
issuance of subpoenas calling for the production of 
documents, as well as the untimely service of deposition 
notices. However, the Court also finds that the defendant 
7 
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is not blameless. In particular, the defendant has been 
noncooperative with discovery, specifically with respect to 
stalling discovery. But for the defendant's bankruptcy 
filing, which remains an open and active case, the Court 
would deem it appropriate to appoint a special master to 
assist with the resolution of further discovery disputes, 
and the Court would make a preliminary allocation of special 
master costs to be borne 75% by the plaintiff and 25% by the 
defendant, while reserving for later determination a final 
allocation of such costs." R. at 940. 
9. Merena's adversary complaint in bankruptcy court 
eventually came on for a trial in Montana, resulting in the 
issuance of a lengthy memorandum decision ruling against 
Merena on all counts. As part of the bankruptcy court's 
ruling, and of particular note to this proceeding, Judge 
Kirscher found that Merena was "not a credible witness", and 
that he [Merena] had an "apparent desire to strangle Alice 
[Davis] through legal proceedings". R. at 1248-75 (emphasis 
added). Judge Kirscher dismissed Merena's adversary 
complaint with prejudice. Id. 
10-. With the continued assistance of counsel, Merena 
promptly appealed the dismissal of his adversary complaint, 
8 
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but his appeal was denied. R. at 2576-2626. Following the 
denial of Merena's bankruptcy appeal, Davis/ Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition was finally approved and discharged. R. 
at 2563-66. 
11. Thereafter, Merena continued to pursue his 
defamation case against Davis in state court. However, in 
light of Davis' bankruptcy discharge, Judge Lindberg issued 
a ruling precluding Merena from seeking monetary relief 
against Davis. The court limited Merena's sole remaining 
claim to injunctive relief. R. at 2140-46. 
12. Although Judge Lindberg allowed Merena's claim for 
injunctive relief to proceed, she quickly became concerned 
with his abusive litigation tactics, which were now 
occurring pro se. She expressed concern that Merena might 
be using this case for an improper purpose to vex and harass 
Davis, and deemed it appropriate to warn him about his 
conduct, issuing a ruling as follows: 
a. "[T]he Court does not want discovery to be a 
tool for Mr. Merena to harass Defendant". R. at 1377-81. 
b. "To be sure, the nature of Plaintiff's 
[discovery] questions to Defendant and Mr. Morrison 
[Defendant's counsel], as well as Mr. Merena's other 
9 
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tactics, lead the Court to question the legitimacy of this 
law suit, or whether the suit is just an avenue for him to 
harass Defendant. For now, the Court will give Mr. Merena 
the benefit of the doubt and allow him to pursue his claims. 
However, Mr. Merena is put on notice that the Court will not 
tolerate further obstreperous behavior on his part. Mr. 
Merena cannot continue with abusive discovery practices." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
13. In a subsequent Ruling and Order dated June 22, 
2009, Judge Lindberg granted Merena a limited extension of 
discovery for the sole purpose of taking three final 
depositions. However, the Court placed a one-hour time 
limit on those depositions, ordered that they be completed 
within 45 days, and explicitly instructed Merena to comply 
with the Standards of Professionalism and Civility as 
promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court. [R. at 1860-63]. 
14. After being explicitly warned by Judge Lindberg to 
improve his behavior in this case, and to limit his 
discovery to certain well-defined parameters, Merena 
proceeded to commit additional discovery abuses, ignoring 
the limitations that had been imposed upon him. R. at 2213-
87. • 
10 
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15. In response to Merena's improper, abusive 
litigation tactics, Davis filed a motion for sanctions 
against him. As- part of the motion, Davis sought the 
dismissal of Merena's complaint. Jd. In ruling on the 
matter, Judge Lindberg found Merena to be in clear violation 
of her orders and finally deemed it necessary to dismiss his 
remaining cause of action with prejudice. She also imposed 
additional monetary sanctions against Merena. R. at 2498-
2505. 
16. Thereafter, Merena refused to comply with the 
court's sanction orders, refusing to pay the monetary 
sanctions in a timely fashion. As a result, Davis commenced 
contempt of court proceedings against him.. On August 18, 
2010, Judge Lindberg found Merena in contempt of court. 
Among other things, she imposed court fines of $2,000.00 
against him, and issued a bench warrant for his arrest, 
setting a cash only bail in the amount of $20,007.00. R. at 
2842-51. 
17. Merena's noncompliance with existing court orders 
has not been limited to this case only, but has extended 
into other cases as well. The Record shows that he has not 
only been held in contempt of court,by Judge Lindberg, but 
11 
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also by Judge Medley in connection with civil number . 
074903538. A copy of Judge Medley's civil contempt order is 
found in the Record at 2816-29 (for convenience, a copy is 
attached hereto at Addendum 2). Judge Medley held Merena in 
contempt of court for violating a protective order that 
Davis had obtained against him. Following an evidentiary 
hearing at which Merena appeared and was represented by 
counsel, Judge Medley imposed a monetary fine against Merena 
in the amount of $3,000.00, and also ordered him to serve 
time in jail, to be stayed upon his timely payment of the 
court fine and also timely payment of Davis' costs and 
attorney fees. Icl. Pertinent portions of the findings and 
ruling made by Judge Medley are as follows: 
a. "When [Merena's] testimony is considered in 
the context of what can only be described as an obsessive 
desire and behavior pattern by [Merena] to take advantage of 
every opportunity to maintain some form of contact with 
petitioner, [Merena's] testimony that he called petitioner's 
mother and did not ask her to contact petitioner is 
unbelievable." Addendum 2, at 7. 
b. "Respondent's conduct in this regard can only 
be described as threatening, intimidating and demonstrates 
12 
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an absence of balance and a suggestion of serious mental 
health challenges." Id. at 10. ' 
c. "[R]espondent's highly suspect conduct weighs 
heavily against his credibility which is nonexistent." Id. 
d. "The Court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the placing of the tracking device on Ms. 
Merena's vehicle occurred after the Protective Order was 
issued, and that is in clear violation of the Protective 
Order." Id. at 8. 
e. "Irrespective of the outstanding warrants, the 
respondent has engaged in despicable, frightening conduct . 
toward petitioner." Jd. at 9. 
18. Judge Medley's contempt order indicatea that 
criminal charges have been filed against Merena in the State 
of Montana, which charges remain outstanding. Icl. at 9. • 
19. Despite the litany of sanctions that have been 
imposed against him, apparently without any real effect, 
Merena has continued to pursue litigation against Davis. 
Among other things, he has caused a second complaint for 
defamation to be filed against Davis in Third District 
Court, civil number 090403270, .Judge Kouris presiding. . Not 
coincidentally, Mer.ena is represented by the same counsel in 
13 
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that case as is currently representing him in this appeal. 
In the second defamation action, Merena has filed a sworn 
declaration revealing that he has left Utah and is now 
residing out of the country. Addendum 3. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal should be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. It is undisputed that Merena has sought to 
appeal a non-final, non-appealable order. Merena readily 
admits that he is appealing the- lower court's Ruling of-
November 20, 2009, and he readily admits that such ruling 
was never reduced to a final order. However, he contends 
that his appeal should nevertheless be allowed to proceed, 
because he is also appealing "other orders" of the lower 
court, which have been reduced to final orders. Merena 
cites to no case law or other- legal authority to support his 
position, and Utah law is 'clearly against his position. 
Because no final order has been entered in this case, 
Merena's appeal is at best premature and must be dismissed. 
Merena's appeal should also be dismissed because he has 
not properly preserved the issues he is attempting-to 
appeal. .Not a single issue presented in Merena's Appellant 
14 
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Brief was ever properly raised at the lower court level. 
Because Merena has failed to timely and properly raise these 
issues below,, he has failed to preserve these issues for 
appeal. His appeal should therefore be dismissed. 
Finally, a fair and impartial look at the sanctions 
entered against Merena at the lower court level shows that 
such sanctions were warranted. If anything, the lower court 
was overly restrained with Merena. It certainly did not 
rush to employ harsh sanctions against him. Instead, the 
court employed a graduated scale of sanctions, first 
attempting to employ lesser sanctions before deeming it 
necessary to increase the severity of the same. After 
Merena's bad behavior continued unabated, the lower court 
was finally prompted to dismiss his complaint. The 
dismissal was entered only as a last resort, and only after 
Merena had been given clear, unequivocal notice that further 
bad behavior on his part would not be tolerated. Merena 
willfully chose to ignore such warnings and proceed at his 
peril. He cannot now be heard to complain that the 
sanctions that were levied against him were too harsh. 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION BECAUSE A FINAL ORDER HAS NOT 
BEEN ENTERED 
Appellee Davis respectfully moves this Court pursuant 
to Rule 10(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
other applicable law for an Order dismissing the instant 
appeal on the grounds that Merena has sought to appeal a 
non-final, non-appealable order. Because the lower court 
has not entered a final order, Merena's appeal is improper 
and not ripe for adjudication. Consequently, this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the same should 
be dismissed forthwith.1 
It is undisputed that Merena is seeking to appeal the 
xOn September 22, 2011, Appellee filed a motion to 
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that 
Merena was improperly seeking to appeal a non-final order. 
In response, Merena filed a memorandum in opposition, 
admitting that he was appealing the lower court's Ruling of 
November 2'0, 2 009, and admitting that said ruling was not a 
final order. (See Appellant's Verified Response to 
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and/or Motion for 
Summary Disposition at 2.) However, Merena argued that he 
was also appealing "'other orders and rulings", therefore 
somehow justifying his appeal. .Id. This Court subsequently 
entered an Order dated October 25, 2011, deferring a ruling 
on the jurisdictional issue pending plenary presentation of 
the case and directing the Appellee to present the issue in 
her brief. Appellee hereby does so and respectfully re-
asserts her motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
16 
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lower court's ruling of November 20, 2009, which sanctioned 
Merena for persistent discovery abuses" and for his ongoing 
failure to abide by the orders of the court. (See n.l) The 
ruling in question is attached to Merena's Appellant Brief 
at Addendum C. This ruling has never been reduced to a 
final, written order. As such, it remains a non-final, non-
appealable order. A review of the lower court docket 
indicates that no party has ever submitted an order in 
conformity with the court's ruling sufficient to satisfy the 
strictures of Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2). While it appears 
that the parties may have simply treated the ruling as the 
final expression of the order of the court, such treatment 
does not pass muster for purposes of pursuing an appeal. 
The explicit requirements of Rule 7(f)(2) have not been 
satisfied. Hence, Merena's appeal is not properly before 
this Court, and the same should therefore be dismissed. 
The case of Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 
2, 201 P.3d 966 (Utah 2009), is on point. In Giusti, the 
Utah Supreme Court had occasion to rule on the timeliness of 
an appeal. The court cited to Rule 7(f)(2) and noted that 
the entry of a final order-in conformity with the 
requirements of the Rule is what triggers the appeal period. 
17 
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The court stated as follows: 
The rule is clear.' A prevailing party shall 
prepare for entry a proposed order in 
conformity with the court's decision. There 
are only two exceptions to this mandate. 
First, if the court approves a proposed order 
that is submitted with an initial memorandum, , 
then no additional order is necessary. Second, 
if the court directs that no additional order 
is necessary, then none is. 
Giusti, 2009 UT 2, 121 (emphasis in original). 
In the instant case, the lower court entered its ruling 
on November 20, 2009. Thereafter, it appears that neither 
party ever submitted an order to be entered in conformity 
with the ruling. This is fatal to Merena's appeal, because 
the requirements of Rule 7(f)(2) remain unsatisfied. The 
two exceptions to Rule 7(f)(2) mentioned by the Giusti court 
are simply not present in this case. No proposed order was 
ever submitted by the parties in connection with an initial I 
memorandum. Likewise, no statement appears in the lower 
court's ruling of November 20, 2009, providing that it is 
( 
the final expression of the court and that no further 
additional order is necessary. By attempting to appeal this 
nonfinal ruling, Merena's appeal is improper and ill-taken. , 
Again, according to the Giusti court, an appeal is not 
triggered until the mandate's of Rule 7(f) (2) have been 
18 
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satisfied. The Giusti court stated as follows: "It is the 
entry of the final order according to rule 7(f)(2) that 
triggers the appeal period. If the court fails to satisfy 
rule 7(f) (2)'s exceptions and if the prevailing party fails 
to prepare an order for entry, ^the appeal rights of the 
nonprevailing party will extend indefinitely.'" Id. at 535 
(citations omitted). 
Merena appears to believe that a later order entered by 
the lower court on April 8„ 2011, is sufficient to 
constitute a final order for purposes of appeal. Attached . 
to his brief at Addendum G is a copy of the order of April 
8, 2011. While on its face it purports to call itself a 
"Final Order and Judgment", just because it calls itself a 
final order does not make it one. The order in question 
merely reduces to judgment certain monetary sanctions that 
had already been entered by the lower court against Merena. 
It does nothing more. It certainly does not purport to be 
the "conforming order" contemplated by Rule 7(f)(2) with 
respect to the lower court's ruling of November 20, 2009. 
As such, no final appealable order has yet been entered by 
the lower court in this matte:;, Merena' s appeal is thus 
improper and must be dismissed. See, e.g., Montgomery v. 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Cottam, 2011 UT App 308, 12 ("Generally, *[a]n appeal is 
improper if it is taken from an order or judgment that is 
not final.'" (citing Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 19, 5 
P.3d 64 9)). . 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court lacks jurisdiction 
to hear Merena's appeal, and should therefore dismiss the 
appeal forthwith. 
II. MERENA DID NOT PROPERLY PRESERVE THE ISSUES 
HE IS NOW SEEKING TO APPEAL 
Setting aside the jurisdictional problem that is fatal 
to this appeal, Merena's appeal should also be dismissed 
because he has improperly sought to appeal several issues 
that were never presented at the lower court level below. 
For example, Argument I of Merena's Appellant Brief asserts 
that the lower court's sanctions were too harsh and were an 
abuse of discretion. However, this issue was never raised 
below. Likewise Argument II, involving a claim that the 
lower court exceeded its authority in acting as a 
"collection agency" for Davis, was never raised below. 
Additionally, Argument III, involving a request to modify 
Utah law and afford Merena the right against self-
incrimination at a civil contempt proceeding, was never 
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raised below. Merena is not entitled to pursue an appeal of 
matters that were not properly raised below. His appeal 
should therefore be summarily dismissed. 
Utah law is clear in holding that issues must be 
preserved for appeal, or they will be deemed waived. Only 
in very limited, narrow circumstances will an appellate 
court review an issue on appeal that was not properly raised 
below. The basic rule in Utah is: "[I]n order to preserve 
an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home 
Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, f 14, 48 P.3d 968 (citing 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 
1998)). 
The need for a party to preserve an issue on appeal by 
first raising it below is not a minor, unimportant matter. 
Fundamentally, it serves an extremely important purpose. It 
serves to put the lower court on notice of the asserted 
error, and it allows for timely correction of the same, if 
appropriate. Badger, 966 P.2d at 847. For a trial court to 
be afforded an opportunity to correct an error, "(1) the 
issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue 
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must be specifically raised[,] and (3) the challenging party 
must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority." Brookside, 2002 UT 48 at 1 14 (quoting Badger, 
966 P.2d at 847). "Issues that are not raised [below] are 
i 
usually deemed waived." Id. 
In this case, Merena has failed in his Appellant Brief 
to demonstrate that he has properly preserved the issues he 
is seeking to appeal. He outright concedes that his third 
appellate issue was not properly preserved for appeal, but 
he nevertheless argues for an extraordinary exception to { 
apply (see Appellant Brief at 32-35) . Regarding his first 
two appellate issues, his brief is woefully silent as to how 
i 
or when such issues were preserved for appeal. Rule 
24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires Merena to include in his brief a statement of the | 
issues presented for review and Ma citation to the record 
showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court". 
I 
Merena's brief fails to comply with this rule. His 
statement of issues presented on appeal is woefully 
inadequate and noncompliant. i 
As the party bringing this appeal, Merena has the 
burden of complying with all necessary requirements to 
22 
< 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
perfect an appeal. Given the size of the record in this 
case, it is not the Appellee's obligation to ferret through 
the record and attempt to discern where, if at all, Merena 
has properly preserved his issues for appeal. Merena's 
noncompliant brief fails to show that he has duly satisfied 
his appellate requirements. Consequently, Merena's appeal 
is not well advanced and should be dismissed immediately, 
without any further cost, delay, or prejudice to Davis. 
III. THE LOWER COURT WAS WELL WITHIN ITS AUTHORITY 
TO SANCTION MERENA, AND IT ACTED APPROPRIATELY 
IN DOING SO 
Throughout the pendency of this case, Merena has acted 
as if he is a law unto himself. He has persistently refused 
to abide by the orders of the court, except when it has been 
convenient for him to do so. When rulings and orders have 
gone against him, he has filed motions to reconsider or to 
alter or amend the court's rulings. See, e.g., R. at 1758-
1814. He is the classic example of a vexatious, abusive 
litigant. 
Even Merena's appellate counsel has conceded it was 
appropriate- for the lower court to sanction Merena for his 
repeated misconduct and discovery abuses. (See, e.g.. 
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Appellant Brief at 11: "It is uncontested that Mr. Merena's 
conduct warranted sanctions ...") However, counsel takes 
umbrage with the purported severity of the sanctions that 
were imposed, contending that they were too harsh. Merena's 
counsel argues that a simple monetary sanction would have 
sufficed as an appropriate punishment in this case. This 
argument is clearly not tenable. 
In dealing with Merena's persistent misconduct, the 
lower court did not immediately rush to dismiss Merena's 
complaint. Instead, it first considered and imposed lesser 
sanctions against him, gradually increasing the severity of 
the sanctions until it became absolutely appropriate and 
necessary to dismiss Merena's complaint as a last resort. 
Initially, the first sanction that was imposed against 
Merena was a monetary sanction. This sanction was imposed 
after Merena engaged in improper, abusive written discovery 
tactics. He was ordered to pay costs and attorney fees to 
the defendant in a fairly nominal amount ($977.50). [R. at 
938-52, 2476-788.] 
Unfortunately, Merena persisted with his abusive 
discovery tactics.. After these abuses were brought to the 
attention of .-the court, Judge Lindberg issued a ruling 
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expressing concern that Merena was using this case for an 
improper purpose, i.e., to vex and harass Davis, rather than 
to advance meritorious claims.2 The court deemed it 
appropriate to warn Merena about his behavior, and directed 
him to improve his conduct. R. at 1377-81. The court 
stated that it would continue to give him the benefit of the 
doubt for now, but directed him to adhere to the standards 
of professionalism and civility. The court also explicitly 
cautioned him not to engage in any further obstreperous 
conduct. Xd. The court ruled: "Mr. Merena is put on notice 
that the Court will not tolerate further obstreperous 
behavior on his part. Mr. Merena cannot continue with 
abusive discovery practices." Id. 
After Merena sought leave to complete certain discovery 
requests, the lower court granted him permission to do so. 
At the same time, the court deemed it necessary to put 
certain limitations in place. In doing so, the court again 
put Merena on notice that he needed to comply with the 
2Despite Merena's assertions to the contrary, the lower 
court never found his claims to be meritorious. The lower 
court never had occasion to reach the merits of this case, 
because Merena's claims were dismissed before trial. 
Consequently, the lower court could only, at best, deem 
Merena's claims to be potentially meritorious. 
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court's discovery limitations. R. at 1860-63. 
Despite being given clear, ample warning by'the lower 
court that further misconduct on his part would not be 
tolerated, Merena nevertheless chose to ignore such 
i 
warnings. At his own peril, he willfully proceeded to 
disregard the discovery limitations that had been imposed 
upon him, intentionally violating the scope of permissible ( 
discovery by taking unnecessarily prolonged depositions and 
asking completely improper, irrelevant questions of deposed • 
i 
witnesses. [R. at 2213-87, 2498-05.] As a. result, the 
lower court was finally compelled to dismiss his complaint, 
but only as a last resort. '
 ( 
It is important to note that Merena's malfeasance in 
this case was not an isolated, single event. Instead, it 
was part .of a pattern of ongoing, egregious misconduct 
spanning not only the entirety of this case but also pouring 
over into other cases involving Merena and Davis as parties „• 
rSee, e.g., R. at 1248-75 (bankruptcy proceeding) and also 
Addendum 2 (protective order proceeding).] 
It is clear from the history of this case that Merena 
has not"been deterred by simple'monetary sanctions, He has 
repeatedly ignored such sanctions,' and he has not paid a 
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single cent-towards satisfying them.- Hence, monetary 
sanctions alone have no meaning to Merena, and are 
absolutely not an adequate remedy to compel him to behave. 
Regarding Merena's claim that the lower court should 
have been more lenient with him as a pro se litigant, it has 
already been amply demonstrated above that the court 
afforded him more than adequate latitude and patience, 
probably much more than he deserved. At this juncture of 
the.case, Merena should not be afforded any more leniency. 
•He is, for all intents and purposes, a professional 
litigant. He is no stranger to the litigation process, 
having been involved in numerous court actions, including a 
reported case dating back nearly 30 years. Fong v. Merena, 
655 P.. 2d 875 (Hawaii 1982). . He does not- respect the court 
system, as is clear from his lack of compliance with, the 
numerous court orders that have been entered against him, 
which remain unsatisfied, (See, e.g., R. at 2498-05, 2842-
48; Addendum 2.) Simply stated, Merena is not deserving of 
any more latitude or leniency. 
Merena has not shown good cause to afford him relief 
from the sanctions that have been entered''against him. H£s--
appeal should therefore be denied. 
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IV. MERENA HAS NO STANDING TO REQUEST A CHANGE IN 
UTAH LAW 
Very little needs'to be said in response to Merena's 
argument that Utah law should be altered to afford him a 
right against self-incrimination-at a civil contempt 
hearing. Despite having been given clear notice of the 
contempt hearing in this case, and despite having been 
ordered to appear at the hearing upon threat of an arrest 
warrant being issued in his absence, Merena did not even 
show up. As a result, he made no incriminating statements 
at the hearing, and the burden of proof never shifted to him 
to do anything at the hearing. 
The basis for holding Merena in contempt of court was 
well outlined in Davis' contempt motion (R. at 2669-80), in 
the evidence presented at the contempt hearing (see R. at 
2814-15), and in the lower court's "Contempt Hearing 
Decision" (a copy of which is attached to Merena's Brief at 
Addendum E). Merena has advanced no legitimate reason to 
upset the contempt order sanctions that were entered against 
him, inasmuch as he did not even bother to attend the 
_contempt hearing.3 His request to alter Utah law to afford 
3Regarding Merena's assertion that the lower court 
improperly shifted the burden of proof to him on the issue 
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him a right against self-incrimination lacks merit. His 
appeal should therefore be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Merena's appeal (his third attempt to file an appeal in 
this matter) is untimely, Merena has once again improperly 
attempted to appeal a non-final order. Because Merena's 
appeal has not been properly taken, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to' hear the appeal, and should dismiss the same 
forthwith. 
Merena's appeal also fails on its merits. Merena has 
of whether he had the ability to pay contempt sanctions, 
this argument lacks merit- and. is not properly advanced on 
appeal. Once again, this issue was never properly raised 
below. Further, to the extent that Merena is attempting to 
challenge the lower court's contempt findings,, he has not 
carried his marshaling burden. His argument is therefore 
not well taken. Moreover, the Record amply supports a 
finding that Merena had an ability to pay contempt 
sanctions. For one thing, he has never had a problem paying 
for the army of attorneys that.have represented him in this 
case, nor has he had a problem paying for the army of 
attorneys that have represented him in the companion cases 
occurring simultaneously with this one. As well, he has 
never had a problem covering the cost of the mountain of 
paperwork he has filed in this case7 deluging the lower 
.court docket, A fair and reasonable inference can easiVyvbe 
drawn that at all times material herein he has had the 
ability to pay the monetary sanctions that have been entered 
against him. He has simply chosen not to pay those 
sanctions. It appears he has no intention of ever doing so. 
29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not set forth any appropriate, legitimate basis for 
"reversing the rulings and orders of the lower court.. He was , 
properly sanctioned by the lower court, and he has not shown 
any reason on appeal to upset the sanctions that have been 
entered against him. Further, he has not even properly 
preserved the issues he is seeking to appeal. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should summarily 
dismiss Merena's appeal, and order that the cost bond he has 
posted be released to Davis. This Court should enter such 
further and additional relief to Davis as it may deem to be { 
just and proper in the premises. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1<?TU day of 
i 
Novfr^S-e^ , 2 011. 
MORRISON LAW OFFICE, INC. 
UAM 
Will Morrison 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Merena's Previous Efforts to Appeal 
2. Judge Medley Contempt Order 
3. Declaration of Kenneth Merena , 
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FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 1 1 2009 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Ken Merena and dba Merena 
Investments, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
Alice M. Merena, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20090723-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Orme, and McHugh. 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Mr. Merena failed to 
timely file his petition for interlocutory appeal. See Utah R. 
App. P. 5(a) (requiring that petitions for interlocutory appeal 
be filed withing twenty days after entry of the applicable 
order) . 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is denied. 
Dated this / / * * - ; day of September, 2 009 
FOR THE COURT: 
M^si^/J.J&^iJL 
Russell W. Bench, Judge' 
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Ken Merena, Pro Se 
44 W. Broadway #1003S 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 372-9349 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KEN MERENA, an individual, and dba 
MERENA INVESTMENTS. ••' : 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
ALICE M. MERENA, 
Defendant and Appellee 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 070915206 
Judge: Denise P. Lindberg 
Notice is hereby given that Kenneth A. Merena, Plaintiff and Appellant in the above captioned 
case, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the Final Order of the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg, 
entered in this matter on October 30, 2009. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment 
DATED this fO day of November, 2009. 
{ 
Ken Merena 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-.-OOOOO 
UTAH APPELLATE. COURTS 
DEC 21 2003 
Ken Merena, an individual, 
and dba Merena Investments, 
< 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v, 
Alice M. Merena, 
Defendant and Appel lee , 
/ 
* ' ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No.. 20090941-CA 
On December 1, 2 009, this court issued a Sua Sponte Motion 
for Summary Disposition on grounds that the October 30, 2009 
order from which this appeal is taken is .not a final, appealable 
order and requiring the parties to submit responses stating why 
the appeal should, or should not, be dismissed, without 
prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction. The parties now stipulate 
that the October 30, 2009 order is not final and appealable and 
the appeal is'premature. We.construe the stipulation as a 
request for voluntary dismissal of the appeal filed pursuant to 
rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed without 
prejudice to the filing of a timely notice"of appeal after the 
district court enters a final, appealable order. The parties are 
to bear their own costs and attorney fees incurred in' this 
appeal. 
Dated this %.&\ LdL. of December, 2009 
FOR THE COURT: 
? 
William A. Thome Jr., Judg 
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UTAH APPELLATE G0UR1 
DEC - h 20QS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOop 
Ken Merena, an individual, 
and dba Merena Investments, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Alice M. Merena, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
/ 
ORDER 
Case'No. 20090941-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Thome. 
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Ken Merena's 
Petition for Emergency- Relief for Stay of District Court 
Proceedings, filed pursuant to rule .8A of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Proceedings, and Motion and Application for Stay of 
District Court Proceedings, filed pursuant to rule, 8 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure.1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for emergency relief 
and the motion and application for a stay of the district court 
proceedings are each denied. 
Dated this 
FOR THE COURT: 
L day of December, 2009 
William A. Thome, Judge 
1. Although Plaintiff has included additional language in the 
titles for his petition and motion," this order disposes of all 
"requests made in the
 ;combined filing, however captioned. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE MICHELLE MERENA, nka : CONTEMPT HEARING DECISION 
ALICE MICHELLE DAVIS, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
t CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, 
: CASE NO, 074903538 
vs. 
• 
KENNETH ALLEN MERENA, 
Respondent. 
An^-evi'deKfeTQ-ry — hearings-*was~~ -held— on-... April —3 0,.. ._2 Q10 > >,...pn-:...tJhLe.,.._:, 
petitioner's request that the respondent be found and held in contempt 
of Court for alleged violations of a cohabitant abuse Protective Order. 
The petitioner was present and represented by her counsel, Grant W. P. 
Morrison. The respondent was present and represented by his counsel, Amy 
E. Hayes Kennedy. The parties, having been duly sworn and examined .under 
oath, and witnesses having, testified on behalf of the parties, and 
documentary evidence having been marked and received by the Court, and 
the Court having heard the arguments of counsel for petitioner and 
respondent, and having inquired into the legal sufficiency of the 
evidence so adduced, and being fully advised in the premises, does now 
make and adopt the following: 
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MSRENA V. MERENA PAGE 2 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 The Court finds that these parties have an extensive, and at 
times extremely contentious, litigation history with one another, as 
follows: 
a. The Annulment: The petitioner filed for divorce from 
respondent on August 20, 2007, in Civil No. 074903660..DA, A Bifurcated 
Decree of Annulment was entered on May 6, 2009. Other than dissolution 
of the marriage and restoration of petitioner to the use of her maiden 
surname, no other claims have been resolved in this case. 
b. The Protective Order (the instant matter): The 
petitioner filed for a Temporary Protective Order on August 14, 2007. 
A Protective Order was stipulated to and entered on August 20, 2007. A 
Modified Protective Order, which allows the parties to be present at and 
personally participate in all hearings, meetings or other required events 
occurring in any civil litigation to which the petitioner and respondent 
are parties/rwas entered on April 17, 2008. The petitioner's Motion for 
Certification of Contempt for Violation of Protective Order .and for 
Attorney's Fees was filed in August 2009. 
c. The First Slander Case: In October 2007, the respondent 
filed a suit against petitioner seeking damages and injunctive relief due 
to alleged slanderous statements made by petitioner. In November 2009, 
Civil No. 070915206 MI was dismissed by Judge Lindberg as a sanction 
against respondent due to discovery abuses in that case. Judge Lindberg 
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MERENA V. MERENA PAGE 3 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
also ordered that petitioner receive a partial award of attorney's fees, 
which as of the evidentiary hearing have not been determined. 
d. The Bankruptcy. In January 2008, the petitioner filed 
for bankruptcy relief in Montana and named respondent as a creditor, 
prompting the respondent to initiate an Adversary Proceeding against 
petitioner- After a trial in December 2008, the Adversary Proceeding was 
dismissed on March 10, 2009. 
e. The Second Slander Case: In February 2 009, the 
respondent filed a second slander suit against petitioner, alleging 
further incidents of slander and seeking damages and injunctive relief. 
In March 2009, the petitioner filed an Answer and Counterclaim in Civil 
No. 090403270 in which she alleges that the respondent's conduct in the 
aforementioned actions support claims for wrongful civil 
proceedings/abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and libel/slander. Petitioner seeks monetary damages from 
respondent. This action remains pending and discovery is ongoing. 
f. The Small Claims Case: On or about October 16, 2 0 07, a 
person by the name of Yu Zhao filed a small claims action against 
petitioner for recovery of a loan. On or about November 27, 2 007, the 
Fourth District Court, Stzte of Utah,_ Prcvo Small Claims Department, 
entered a Small Claims Judgment against petitioner in the total amount 
of $300. Mr. Zhao and respondent are close friends and have been 
business partners. Respondent, assisting Mr. Zhao or acting as his 
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MERENA V. MERENA PAGE 4 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
attorney, paid $1,700 to Elwin Kirkwood, a process server in Montana, 
and obtained a Writ of Execution in Montana with respect to Zhao's $800 
Utah Small Claims Judgment. On or about January 17, 2008, based upon the 
Zhao Judgment, had petitioner's 2003 Honda Civic seized in Montana. 
.2 The Court finds that the in her Affidavit in Support of Motion 
for Certification of Contempt for Violation of the Protective Order and 
for Attorney's Fees, the petitioner alleges four distinct charges of 
contempt against respondent, which are described and hereinafter referred 
to as follows: 
a. Charge 1: ' That ah email sent by respondent to'petitioner 
on September 9, 20 07, violated Paragraph 2 of the Protective Order 
entered by this Court on August 20, 2007; 
b. Charge 2: That a telephone call placed by respondent to 
petitioner's-mother, Marlene Davis, on November 10, 2007, and the ensuing 
22 minute conversation violated Paragraph 2 of the Protective Order 
entered by this Court on August 20, 2007; 
c. Charge 3: That the respondent violated Paragraph 4 of the 
Protective Order entered by this Court on August 20, 2007, by allegedly 
placing a tracking device on her vehicle; 
c. Charge 4: That emails sent by respondent to petitioner 
within the context of the First Slander Case and his general conduct in 
this and other litigation with petitioner constitutes ''harassment" and 
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MERENA V. MERENA PAGE 5 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
thereby violated Paragraph 1 of the Protective Order entered by this 
Court on August 20, 2007. 
3 The Protective Order at issue in the instant action states, on 
page 1, "The court orders the Respondent to obey all'orders initialed on 
this form and to not abuse or threaten to abuse anyone protected by this 
order7'. It further indicates that ^No one except the court can change 
it". The initialed portions of the Order are stated as follows, in 
pertinent part, 
1. Personal Conduct Order. Do not commit, try to commit or 
threaten to commit any form of violence against the Petitioner 
of any.'person'listed on page 1 of this" form.' This includes 
stalking, harassing, threatening, physically hurting, or cause 
any other form of abuse. 
2. No Contact Order. Do not contact, phone, mail, e-mail, or 
communicate in any way with the Petitioner, either directly or 
indirectly. 
4. Stay Away Order. Stay away from: The Petitioner's current 
or future vehicle, job, home, premises and property. 
4 Charge Is The Court finds beyond any reasonable doubt that 
Kenneth A. Merena knowingly and intentionally and willfully violated the 
Protective Order, as follows: 
a. Less char, three weeks following the entry of the 
Protective Order, prior to the modification, which event occurred on or 
about September 9, 2007 (the Protective Order was issued on August 20, 
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MERENA V. MERENA PAGE 6 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
2007), he sent, by email, a letter to the petitioner. Respondent admits 
to sending the letter to petitioner. 
b. The first paragraph of the letter states, VXI realize that 
I am taking * a great risk in writing to you directly, but it is a risk 
that I feel that I must take.: If you choose to hurt me by using the fact 
that I have contacted you directly, I will accept that and suffer the 
consequences of my own actions. However, I think it is so important that 
you hear certain things directly from me, that I must take the risk. I 
hope that you won't use this against me. I am putting my trust in you-
I ask that' ypti try to "do"the" "same for* me*'. * 
5 The Court finds that Mr. Merena knew of the Protective Order, 
having stipulated to its entry, and, further, knew that he was not to 
contact or email or write Ms. Davis. Indeed, Mr. Merena, in his letter, 
acknowledges his violation in this very writing. Irrespective of. the 
Protective Order, Mr. Merena sent Ms. Davis an email .letter, on or about 
September 9, 2 0 07, in clear violation the Protective Order and 
particularly paragraph 2, that prohibits that very action. The Court 
finds that Mr. Merena's claimed justification for sending the letter to 
prevent petitioner from committing suicide or some other moral 
"justification is without merit. The Court finds'Mr. Merena has violated 
the Protective Order and he is found in contempt for this violation. 
6 Charge 2: The Court finds that Mr. Merena next contacted the 
petitioner's mother on or about November 10, 2007 and claimed he had been 
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MERENA V. MERENA PAGE 7 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
involved in a motorcycle accident and received severe head trauma and 
spinal cord injuries. Although the evidence is conflicting, the Court 
finds that respondent then asked the petitioner's mother, Marlene Davis, 
to pass along to Alice how sorry he was and that he wasn't thinking 
rationally at the time of the incident -in Silver Gate, and to please tell 
Alice I love'her and miss her. 
7 The Court finds by clear. and convincing evidence . that Mr. 
Merena's communication with petitioner's mother is a clear violation of 
the Protective Order, particularly paragraph 2, that prohibits 
communicating", either directly or indirectly with the petitioner-.-
Respondent's testimony that he did not ask Marlene Davis, to communicate 
with petitioner is not credible. When respondent's testimony is 
considered in the context of what can only be described as an obsessive 
desire and behavior pattern by respondent -to take advantage of every 
opportunity *' to maintain some form of contact with petitioner, 
respondent's,.testimony that he called petitioner's mother and did not ask 
her to contact petitioner is unbelievable. 
8 Charge 3: The Court finds that Mr. Merena contacted Elwin 
Kirkwood, a Registered Process Server in the. State of Montana in an 
effort: to enf-roe Mr. Zhao's Utah $3 00 small clair.s Jo.o-grnent. The Court 
finds that during one or more of the conversations .with Mr. Kirkwood, 
that Kenneth Merena advised Mr. Kirkwood that he, Kenneth Merena, had 
placed a tracking device on Ms. Merena's automobile. The Court finds 
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that Mr. Kirkwood's testimony was very credible. That Mr. Kirkwood is 
a disinterested third party witness who was well spoken and had excellent 
recall of his conversations with respondent. Mr. Kirkwood testified that 
respondent knew of petitioner's location, who petitioner associated with 
and knew of where and when petitioner's children:went to school. The 
Court finds .that respondent's stated knowledge of petitioner's and her 
children's daily activities is consistent with respondent's statement to 
Mr. Kirkwood that he (respondent) put a tracking device on petitioner's 
vehicle so he could follow her at all times. Further, Mr, Kirkwood 
testif ied'-that respondent "was- persl'S'teiit'iri Talking stbout personal" themes'" 
between respondent and petitioner and that respondent threatened he was 
going to contact petitioner's ex-husband to try to get petitioner's 
children taken away from her. The Court finds respondent's obsessive and 
irrational behavior towards petitioner is frightening and in violation 
of this Court's Protective Order. Respondent's testimony that Mr. 
Kirkwood's testimony is full of lies, that he (respondent) doesn't recall 
the name of^a private detective he hired and that he stipulated to the 
Protective Order without knowledge of what he was doing is not credible. 
3 The Court further finds that Mr, -Merena told Mr. Kirkwood to 
remove the tracking device from the vehicle. The Court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the placing of the tracking device on Ms. 
Merena's vehicle occurred after the -Protective Order was issued, and that 
it is in clear violation of the Protective Order. 
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10 • Charge 4 s The Court finds that in November 2007, the 
petitioner reported the conduct described as Charges 1 and 2 to the 
Billings (Montana) Police Department, and that as a result, two 
misdemeanor charges have been filed against respondent, for which a 
Warrant for -Arrest was issued by the Municipal Court of th:e City of 
Billings on January 31, 2008. As of the date of the present hearing, 
respondent has not appeared in the Montana Municipal Court and the 
Warrants and charges remain outstanding. Irrespective of the outstanding 
warrants, the respondent has engaged in despicable, frightening conduct 
"toward petitibner.""""' For "example,'*'he has gone far beyond" the allowance 
given him by Judge Lindberg in the libel and slander case. He opted to 
represent himself, and in an email couched as a "type" of interrogatory, 
sought "the name, address, phone number and e-mail of the man you slept 
with in Bozeman, Montana on your way back to Billings, MT, after your 
August 21, 2 0 07 departure from Salt Lake City." x He also, in the same 
email, sought "The name of the person that owns the silver Honda that has 
been parked in your carport for the last three weeks (approximately) ." 
1
 Kenneth A- Merena had filed a libel and slander action against Alice Merena and 
deposed her on the 13th day of February, 2009, Although Judge Lindberg allowed the 
deposition, she was clear :,i a hearing prior to the d-position that Mr, Merena was not to violate 
. the Protective Order in pb :e. She allowed the parries to communicate only by email, and that 
communication could only relate to the libel and slander lawsuit. Following Alice Merena on her 
way back to Montana, or having her followed, is a clear violation of the Protective Order, as is 
the next paragraph relating to knowledge of a vehicle in her carport for the prior three weeks. 
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This email was sent to Alice Davis on or about the 26th day of February, 
2009. In addition, he has asked questions via email that far surpassed 
the limits allowed by Judge Lindberg, including demanding communication 
"That would necessarily require you to check your specially created e-
mail account for messages on a regular basis, at a minimum, daily" . 
11 The Court finds that respondent's conduct described herein is 
far beyond '"what was contemplated in the Amended Protective Order. 
Indeed, even Judge Lindberg addressed in her Memorandum Decision 
dismissing Mr. Merena's case against Alice Merena, (Case No. 0709152 06) 
that his excesses relating to discovery resulted in*the dismissal of the 
case and sanctions being imposed. Mr. Merena's relying on Judge 
Lindberg's Order was.ill taken and evidence introduced at trial did not 
support his argument. Respondent's conduct in this regard>can only be 
described as threatening, intimidating and demonstrates an absence of 
balance and a suggestion of serious mental health challenges. However, 
with regard \to Charge 4, the Court finds that respondent's general 
litigation conduct although very troubling, does not satisfy the 
statutory definition of harassment in Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-106, 
therefore, Charge 4 has not been proven by clear and convincing evidence 
and is ordered dismissed. It should be noted, however, that' respondent's 
highly suspect conduct weighs heavily against his credibility which is 
nonexistent. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 The Court has jurisdiction over both parties and the subject 
matter in this case. 
2 The Court, finds beyond any reasonable doubt and by clear and 
convincing evidence as referenced herein that respondent Kenneth Merena 
is in contempt of the Court's Orders, without justification, as reflected 
in the Findings of Fact as to Charges 1, 2 and 3. Charge 4 is Ordered 
dismissed. 
3 Based upon respondent's egregious and contemptuous conduct, 
respondent is Ordered to serve thirty (30) days in the Salt Lake County 
Jail on each'of the three charges for a total of ninety (90) days, to run 
consecutively without any credit for good time served and not to be 
released to home confinement or ankle monitoring. 
4 .The Court-Ordered jail time is stayed for a period of time 
commensurate with the period of time the Modified Protective Order 
remains in effect, which under Utah Code Ann., § 78B-7-106(10), is an 
indefinite period of time until modified or vacated by the Court. Based 
upon respondent's conduct- described herein, petitioner is in need of and 
is entitled to protection- from respondent for the maximum time available 
under the law. This st:.y is conditioned upon respondent's strict 
compliance with the specific terms of the Modified Protective Order and 
timely payment of the fines, costs and attorney fees provided for herein. 
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5 Based upon respondent/s contemptuous conduct and Utah Code 
Ann., § 78B-6-310, the Court elects to impose a fine upon respondent in 
the amount of $1,000 on each of the three charges, for a total of $3,000 
to be paid in full within thirty (30) days of entry of this Contempt 
Hearing Decision. , 
6 .-• In accordance with Utah Code Ann., § 78B-6-311, and the 
Court's Inherent Authority, petitioner is awarded Judgment against 
respondent for her costs, expenses and reasonable attorney fees, to be 
supported by Affidavit and which shall be satisfied by respondent within 
thirty (30) days ""of entry of the Judgment. Griffith v. Griffith/ 985 
P.2d 255 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1999); Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487 
' (Ut. Ct. App'. 1994) . 
7 This signed Contempt Hearing Decision shall constitute the 
Order and Judgment of the • Court, counsel and parties should govern 
themselves accordingly. 
Dated this 0 day of June, 2010. 
TYRONE E- MEDLEY 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the' 
foregoing Contempt Hearing Decision,. Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, to the following, this \ day of June, 2010: 
Grant W. P. -Morrison 
Matthew G. Morrison 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
352 East 900? South 
•Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
'Amy E."Hayes Kennedy 
Attorney for Respondent 
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXECUTED this J^Z day of October, 2010-. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herefey certify that on Octoberj£i, 2010,1 emailed a true-and correct copy of the-
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